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COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES AND INDUSTRYWIDE PROJECTS
Edwin S. Rockefeller*
It is important to grasp three fundamentals. First, there is no ethical con-
tent in any of the matters with which we are here concerned. It has been my
good fortune to spend the past nine years working on these matters - about
half that time on the FTC staff and the other half in private practice. Two
things which seem clear to me are: (1) you can't learn what it is like to be on
the other side, government or private, without being on it for a while, and (2) an
emotional or evangelistic approach toward compliance, relying on some kind
of ethical considerations, is a mistake on either side. Whether you are the govern-
ment attorney whose duty it is to enforce the laws in the best interest of the
public (with due regard to the demands of practical politics) or the private
attorney whose duty it is to counsel the businessman on compliance with the
laws (with due regard for the profit and loss statement), you should make no
quick or general assumptions about who are the good guys and who are the
bad guys.
Second, I want to be counted among those who would emphasize that the
Robinson-Patman Act is not as complicated as a lot of those with a heavy invest-
ment in complexity might have you think. On the other hand, there are situations
where the law, which we might think of as one or even two dimensional, must
be applied to evolving business situations of three and four dimensions. This
demands something more than an evangelistic tone and an admonition to the
businessman to devote his ingenuity toward developing techniques for compliance
rather than presenting his lawyer and the FTC with difficult situations. Such
an approach often leads to an overabundance of caution, a tendency to inaction
and a likelihood of missing the competitive opportunity. If all a businessman
wants to do is to comply with the Robinson-Patman Act he can sell to all comers
at one price and pay no brokerage, no promotional allowances and grant no
services. But if it is competition that should regulate the economy, that approach
is wrong.
Third, it is counsel's duty as an officer of the court to encourage compliance
with the law. Nevertheless, it is his role as a counselor of private business not
only to state the law where it is clear and try to where it is not but also to
assist the business client to evaluate the risks of alternative courses of action in
order that the businessman may make an informed judgment as to what to
do next. Consider a situation in which the current Commission interpretation
of a particular section is not realistic in the business context in which an attorney
finds himself. For example, suppose the only court which has dealt with the
question has overruled the Commission,' but the Commission has in effect
rejected the court's decision.2 As an officer of the court surely one can be
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1 Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962).
2 FTC News Release, November 23, 1962.
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justified in relying on the court's view of the law. But what one must also
take into account are the risks of (1) detection and (2) possible enforcement
action. I will omit discussion of the techniques for minimizing the likelihood of
detection. Evaluation of the risk of enforcement action combines a mixture of
psychology, politics, timing, and luck.
With these three fundamentals in mind, I proceed to my subject which
is the method of enforcement open to the Commission. Whether we view enforce-
ment as industrywide or otherwise, there are two kinds of compliance- (1)
voluntary compliance without threat of penalty and (2) compliance which
results from Commission action to restrain violations of the law.
The Commission may assist voluntary compliance efforts by focusing pub-
licity on unlawful practices and by educational and guidance efforts. In the
past, most industrywide projects were of this sort. In many instances a great
deal was accomplished. In other situations, failure to follow up the educational
program with serious enforcement proceedings resulted in an erosion of industry
resolve to comply. Mr. MacIntyre's discussion of the gasoline marketing inquiry,
the fresh fruit and vegetable trade practice conference rules and the package
of garment industry orders provides a complete spectrum of possible methods for
encouraging compliance.' Ultimately, there is really only one method available
to the Commission for the effective insistence upon compliance, and that is the
complaint and order proceeding provided in the statute. A trade practice con-
ference, a trade regulation rule proceeding or a general Commission inquiry
may or may not result in rules of greater or lesser substance. Such procedures
may or may not result in findings of fact. These rules and these findings may
be used to shorten a subsequent individual proceeding for a cease and desist
order. But the enforcement proceeding remains basically the same.
Section 11 of the Clayton Act,4 like section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act,' provides that whenever the Commission shall have reason to be-
lieve that any person is violating or has violated any of the provisions of, among
others, section 2 (which contains the Robiuson-Patman Act amendments), the
Commission shall issue and serve upon the respondent a complaint stating its
charges with a notice setting a time and place for hearing at least 30 days after
service of the complaint. According to the statute, the person so complained
of has the right to appear at the hearing and "show cause why an order should
not be entered by the Commission"s requiring the respondent to cease and
desist from the violation of law charged in the complaint. The Commission still
includes this wording in its notice but does not expect the respondent to carry
the burden of showing such cause.' The statute directs that the testimony taken
in the proceeding shall be reduced to writing and filed in the Commission's
office. The statute further provides that if upon such hearing the Commission
3 See, MacIntyre, 'Some Criteria for Applying Industrywide Enforcement Measures Under
the Robinson-Patmanr Act, 41 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 389 (1966).
4 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964).
5 38 Stat. 719 '(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
6 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964).
7 It has never been clear to me how or why the statutory scheme has been subverted on this
point, but perhaps the Administrative Procedure Act has in effect amended these provisions by
implication.
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shall be of opinion that any of the provisions of law have been or are being
violated "it shall make a report in writing, in which it shall state its findings as
to the facts," and it shall issue and serve on the respondent an order "requiring
such person to cease and desist from such violations." (Emphasis added.) 8
Prior to 1959, the Clayton Act provided for the enforcement of Commis-
sion orders by application of the Commission to an appropriate United States
Court of Appeals with a showing that the order had been violated. This ordi-
narily required a prior investigational hearing with findings by the Commission of
facts of violation. The court could affirm, modify or set aside the Commission's
order. Following affirmation in whole or in part, the court could then issue an
order of enforcement which, as the court's own order, would subject a violator
to possible punishment for contempt.
The pre-1959 statute also provided that the respondent might petition an
appropriate court to review the Commission's order. Before 1952 this some-
times resulted in orders of enforcement where the order reviewed was affirmed,
but in that year the Supreme Court held that the courts of appeals were without
authority to issue an order commanding obedience to an order of the Commis-
sion until the Commission had first established violations of its order.9
In 1959 Congress amended section 11 of the Clayton Act "to provide for
the more expeditious enforcement of cease and desist orders."'0 The amending
law contained two sections. The first section amended section 11 by providing
finality for the Commission's Clayton Act orders similar to that already provided
in 1938 by the Wheeler-Lea amendments of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. Under these provisions, if the respondent does not petition for review
within 60 days of service of a Commission cease-and-desist order, the order be-
comes final and violations of the order are subject to civil penalties of up to
5,000 dollars for each violation, recoverable in a civil action brought by the
United States. Section 2 of the amending law stated that section 1 should have
"no application to any proceeding initiated before the date of enactment of
this Act."11 It was explicitly provided that each such proceeding was to be
governed by the provisions of section 11 as they existed previously. Under the
new provisions, there is also a method for review by the court of appeals upon
respondent's petition and a provision that "to the extent that the order of the
Commission is affirmed, the court shall issue its own order commanding obedience
to the terms of such order of the Commission."' 2
There arose the question of possible enforcement of orders issued by the
Commission under section 11 of the Clayton Act prior to the amendment as to
which no enforcement proceeding had been initiated at the time of the amend-
ing act's passage. No provision was made for enforcement of such orders; the
amending statute simply substituted the new provisions for the old, and pro-
vided explicitly only for those old orders as to which enforcement proceedings
had already been initiated.
The Commission sought to close what it regarded as a gap by the issuance
8 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1964).
9 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
10 73 Stat. 243 (1959).
11 73 Stat. 245 (1959).
12 73 Stat. 244'(1959).
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of a press release stating that unless a petition to review an old order was filed
within 60 days, it would regard the old order as final in the same manner as
orders issued since the amendment. I say "what it regarded as a gap" because
there may indeed have been none. Congress may very well have felt that, where
the Commission could find a violation of a pre-1959 Clayton Act order, it could
on the same facts proceed for a new order, which would carry with it the
finality provisions and that this would provide more expeditious enforcement in
any case than retention of the former method which the Commission itself had
long regarded as cumbersome and ineffectual. Several firms against which
Clayton Act orders had been issued prior to the 1959 amendment, not wishing
to run the risk that the Commission's press release view might prevail and civil
penalties later be assessed, sought immediate relief through declaratory judg-
ment actions. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia sustained
these efforts and overruled the Commission's press release.1" In these proceed-
ings, the Commission argued that, unless the old orders could be blanketed in
and made subject to the new-type enforcement, they would be lost forever as
having any enforceability. However, the Commission is now seeking to enforce
one such order through application to the Ninth Circuit as though the old pro-
visions were still in effect.14
Since 1954, public complaints apparently initiating the sort of proceeding
described in section 11 of the Clayton Act have been disposed of without hearings,
without findings, and even without respondent's admission or denial of the facts
alleged, upon respondent's signing an agreement accepting the issuance of an
order prohibiting future violations and waiving any further review. It was
long debated at the Commission whether, in view of the wording of section 11,
orders to cease and desist issued without findings would be enforceable under
the procedures provided in the statute for properly issued orders. In 1954 the
view that they would be enforceable finally prevailed, and the Commission's
procedure has continued substantially in its present form since that time. The
validity of the Commission's present view has never been directly challenged
in court except for that proceeding in the Ninth Circuit referred to above, where
the Commission is seeking to enforce an order issued under its consent procedure.
There is a lot of talk these days about "industrywide" enforcement of the
Robinson-Patman Act. The reason that industrywide treatment has currently
become a matter of such concern may be that violations of the act are so in-
dustrywide. If most firms are complying and only a few are in violation, then
a handful of cease-and-desist order proceedings is all that is called for, and there
is no need for elaborate industry projects. Unfortunately, as the Commission
has increasingly recognized, such is not now the case. The present Commission
has shown flexibility and imagination in trying to deal with the problem. The
Commission has been able to turn the current state of widespread violation of
a law, for the enforcement of which it has been responsible for nearly thirty
years, into cause for praise for the Commission. This is a triumph in the public
relations art which certainly has my admiration.
13 Sperry-Rand Corp. v. FTC, 288 F.2d 403 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
14 FTC v. Jantzen, Inc., No. 20021, 9th Cir. application filed, April 23, 1965.
